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  I
n the aftermath of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
(Figure 1) and in anticipation 
of avian ﬂ  u, the international health 
community has recognized that 
pandemic planning and response is an 
inherently multigovernmental concern. 
The ability of pathogens to cross 
borders and rapidly spread around 
the globe requires highly coordinated 
public health responses that involve the 
cooperation of local, regional, national, 
and supranational governments (Figure 
2). The understanding of this reality 
has informed the current International 
Health Regulations (IHR) revision 
process. 
    Approved in May 2005, the revised 
IHR have increased the disease 
surveillance requirements of “states 
parties” in an effort to better inform 
the pandemic response process and 
to protect the health of the global 
community [1]. Furthermore, 
the revisions have also outlined 
recommendations that the World 
Health Organization (WHO) could 
issue if an outbreak originating in one 
country is perceived to be a threat 
to other countries. The revision 
of the IHR is both long overdue 
and eminently necessary to face 
the challenges of an increasingly 
globalized world [2]. The practical 
implementation of these proposals, 
however, may encounter obstacles. 
This is particularly true for those WHO 
member nations that have federal 
systems of government (federations), 
and could ultimately threaten 
their ongoing support of the new 
regulations. 
    Federalism and Public Health 
Response
    Federalism is a type of political system 
in which the advantages of shared rule 
are combined with those of regional 
government [3]. Countries with 
federal governments make up about 
40% of the world’s population, and 
include the second most populous 
country (India) and the world’s 
largest economy (United States) [4]. 
Federal systems of government offer 
many advantages, including allowing 
for the distinctiveness of the regions 
within a nation to be recognized and 
for region-speciﬁ  c policy approaches 
to be developed. However, one of 
the limitations of federations is that 
the division of powers can create 
an obstacle to the development of 
centralized approaches to national 
challenges. Such scenarios can arise 
when the country’s constitution 
distributes the key powers in question 
to the regions. This characteristic 
of federal systems poses a dilemma 
when international treaties are signed 
by a federal government, but the 
cooperation of regional governments 
(states, provinces, etc.) is necessary for 
compliance with the treaty. 
    Canada’s experience with SARS 
outlines the challenges of such 
constitutional division of powers when 
it comes to managing public health 
crises. During SARS, the Canadian 
federal government’s ability to obtain 
data from the Province of Ontario 
was dependent on voluntary transfer, 
since the management of infectious 
disease outbreaks falls under provincial 
jurisdiction [5,6]. Reviews of the 
response to SARS showed that the 
transfer of data from the provincial 
government to the federal government 
was a key obstacle to the management 
of the crisis and, in particular, limited 
the federal government’s ability to 
effectively communicate the status of 
the outbreak to the WHO (Problem 7 
of [7]).
    The United States encountered 
similar jurisdictional problems when 
developing strategies to address the 
threat of bioterrorism following 
the 2001 anthrax attacks, because 
public health is primarily within 
the jurisdiction of the states [8,9]. 
Concerns about the inadequacy of 
some state public health legislation 
at the time provided the impetus for 
the development of a Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act [10].
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  Figure 1.   “8 Steps Towards SARS 
Prevention”—Public Information Poster 
Issued by the Chinese Government, 2003   
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    In Australia, powers over emergency 
response to public health crises also 
primarily reside at the state level, 
with the federal government having 
limited authority except for quarantine. 
The development of a coordinated 
Australian approach to managing 
new infectious threats has thus been 
a challenge, and there is potential for 
confusion over who has authority in the 
event of a public health emergency that 
crosses state borders [11]. 
    Adding to the challenges 
of developing effective 
intergovernmental approaches to 
disease outbreaks in federations is 
their multidimensional nature. The 
response to an infectious outbreak 
could involve issues of national 
security, emergency response, 
environmental protection, and 
food and water safety. Powers over 
these areas may be differentially 
allocated across the various orders of 
government. Such a scenario could 
produce conﬂ  ict or confusion when 
attempting to determine which order 
of government has the ultimate 
authority over the management of the 
outbreak. This in turn may contribute 
to a failure to adequately manage 
an outbreak and to the spread of 
the outbreak across borders within 
a country, and potentially into other 
countries. 
    The New International Health 
Regulations
    The revisions of the IHR create 
important new challenges to all 
countries, and in particular to those 
with federal systems of government 
(Table 1) [12]. The new IHR 
require all states parties to designate 
representatives to implement 
the surveillance, response, and 
notiﬁ  cation requirements of the 
regulations. These requirements cover 
all jurisdictions from the community 
level to the national level. While 
the previous version only applied to 
three infectious diseases, the new 
IHR apply to “all events that may 
constitute a public health emergency 
of international concern,” and a 
decision-making instrument to assist 
in the identiﬁ  cation of such events is 
included in the regulations. Notiﬁ  able 
events within a state are to be reported 
by a “national IHR Focal Point” to 
the WHO within 24 hours. States are 
also responsible for strengthening 
their surveillance system and are 
required to complete both a capacity 
assessment within two years of the 
approval of the revised Regulations, 
and the development of public 
health infrastructure that ensures full 
compliance within ﬁ  ve years of the 
entry into force (in June 2007) of the 
regulations. 
    The new IHR also explicitly outline 
new WHO powers, which include an 
information-gathering prerogative 
that is not limited solely to ofﬁ  cial 
state notiﬁ  cations or consultations, 
but which covers all “the available 
scientiﬁ  c evidence and other relevant 
information”. The WHO is also 
empowered to share information 
with other states parties if an affected 
state “does not accept the offer of 
collaboration” and “when justiﬁ  ed by 
the magnitude of the public health 
risk”. The revisions also formally 
empower the WHO to issue temporary 
and standing recommendations if an 
outbreak is classiﬁ  ed as a public health 
emergency of international concern. 
These could include recommendations 
to issue travel restrictions for 
persons from affected areas. The 
recommendations would ideally be 
made with the consent of the affected 
country, although provisions exist for 
such action in the absence of the target 
member state’s consent. 
    Federalism and the New 
International Health Regulations
    The realities of federations, and the 
fragmentation of powers within them, 
could become particularly problematic 
when attempting to operationalize 
the new IHR. This is particularly true 
of the surveillance and reporting 
requirements, and it is of particular 
concern given the implications of 
new WHO powers. There is a real 
concern that federations may not 
be able to comply with the IHR, 
which could result in the issuance 
of temporary recommendations that 
would penalize federations for political 
and administrative features that they 
perceive to be beyond their control. 
    While a primarily unitary state may 
have sufﬁ  cient centralized powers 
to ensure that the surveillance and 
reporting requirements embodied in 
the new IHR are met, the allocation 
of powers within federations may 
not permit this. For example, the 
IHR revisions require all member 
nations to notify the WHO “within 24 
hours of assessment of public health 
information, of all events which may 
constitute a public health emergency 
of international concern within its 
territory…as well as any health measure 
implemented in response to those 
events”. However, federal governments 
may not have the authority to collect 
January 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 1  |  e1
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030001.g002
  Figure 2.   Processing SARS Specimens at the Special Pathogens Branch of the CDC
      The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) worked closely with the WHO and other 
partners, as part of a global collaboration to address the SARS outbreak.
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the data necessary for reporting to the 
WHO and the transfer of data from 
the affected regions may not occur 
voluntarily. While, according to the 
new IHR, the federal government can 
designate regional representatives to 
carry out some of the measures, the 
government is ultimately dependent 
on cooperation from these regional 
authorities that may not necessarily be 
forthcoming.
    There are several reasons why 
regional governments, for example, 
may not want to provide complete 
information on the nature of an 
outbreak. These include concern 
about the impact of disclosure on their 
economy, aversion to federal scrutiny, 
concerns about stigmatization, and a 
fundamental belief that the issue being 
addressed is within their jurisdiction. 
Failure to report could have signiﬁ  cant 
consequences, most importantly the 
delay of national and international 
responses to prevent the spread of 
the disease. The resistance of regional 
governments to sharing of information 
could leave a country susceptible to 
measures introduced by the WHO, 
particularly since the WHO now has 
authority to conduct surveillance and 
to utilize information gathered from 
nongovernmental sources through 
the Global Public Health Intelligence 
Network [13,14]. 
    The issuance of travel advisories, as 
occurred during SARS, or of temporary 
recommendations to member nations 
not to accept travelers from an affected 
region, could have damaging effects 
on the economy of that region. The 
perception in Canada was that the 
SARS travel advisory may not have been 
warranted, and had a serious negative 
impact on the economy of Toronto 
[15,16]. In developing countries where 
tourism is essential to the national 
economy, such an advisory could 
be catastrophic. Federations could 
view the use of such measures by the 
WHO as unnecessarily punitive and 
an invasion of national sovereignty. 
Ultimately, this could lead to a lack 
of support for the WHO, the IHR 
and other global strategies for disease 
control [12]. 
  Federalism  and  International 
Agreements 
    The United States, recognizing 
the challenges the IHR could pose 
for federations, had requested the 
insertion of a clause that would 
acknowledge the unique governance 
structures of federations. The decision 
not to include such a clause in the 
revised IHR prompted the United 
States to notify that they intend to 
submit a statement of reservation, 
speciﬁ  cally commenting that they 
will “implement the IHR in a manner 
consistent with (their) federal system of 
government” [17]. 
    The challenges posed by the IHR to 
federations are not unique, however, 
as federations are often confronted 
with difﬁ  culties in implementing 
international agreements. For 
example, the GATT/WTO agreement 
included a federal clause which states 
that “[e]ach contracting party shall 
take such reasonable measures as may 
be available to it to ensure observance 
of the provisions of this Agreement by 
the regional and local governments 
and authorities within its territory”. 
However, there has been variability in 
the interpretation of this clause, with 
certain countries claiming that this 
requires the use of any constitutional 
power available to adhere to the 
agreement, and others arguing that 
this clause should not allow internal 
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  Table 1.   Some Changes to the IHR That Are Relevant to Federations   
Features 1969/1981 IHR 2005 IHR
Applicability Narrow list of three speciﬁ  c diseases All events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, 
which is any event that: (1) may constitute a public health risk to other states through 
the international spread of disease; and/or (2) that may require a coordinated 
international response
Authorities responsible for 
communication with WHO
Unspeciﬁ  ed beyond general reference to 
a country’s health administration (“the 
governmental authority responsible over 
the whole of a territory to which these 
regulations apply”)
Stipulates that each state party: (1) will designate a single National IHR Focal Point, 
“which shall be accessible at all times for communications with WHO” and which 
will disseminate information to, and consolidate input, from relevant sectors of the 
administration; and (2) will establish “the authorities responsible within its respective 
jurisdiction for the implementation of health measures”
Surveillance system Narrow health and sanitary requirements 
for international carriers and at borders 
only
Ports of entry and routine inspection and control standards, plus detailed core public 
health requirements at local and national levels to be met within a speciﬁ  c time frame 
(explicit state obligation to develop, strengthen, and maintain the capacity to detect, 
report, and respond to public health events)
Sources of information Ofﬁ  cial country notiﬁ  cations only All relevant ofﬁ  cial and unofﬁ  cial info, including from nongovernmental organizations, 
individual experts, media, and the Global Public Health Intelligence Network
Issuance of alerts, advisories and 
recommendations
By the Director-General in an ad hoc 
manner, and only to national authorities
By an emergency committee formed from a roster of experts, according to formal 
criteria, with joint participation of affected states, to national authorities and to the 
international community in general; either temporary or standing; subject to scrutiny 
by a review committee
Travel advisories No explicit power to issue, although 
World Health Assembly resolutions 54.14 
(2001), 55.16 (2002), 56.28, and 56.29 
(both 2003) signaled shifts toward this 
expanded new power
Formal authority of an emergency committee to recommend that states parties adopt 
actions ranging from screening to health measures (such as quarantine, isolation and 
contact tracing), to refusal of entry and/or exit of certain persons and goods either to 
or from affected areas (Articles 15–18). Power to issue area-speciﬁ  c travel advisories 
not explicitly stated.
Governance structures Closed processes with no formal public 
availability of crisis reasoning and 
decision-making.
More deliberative transparent process supplemented by both the IHR Advisory Panel 
and Permanent Review Committee charged with overseeing the functioning of the 
regulations
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federal structures to be compromised 
[18,19]. The Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
has generated similar challenges to 
implementation in federal states, and 
it is notable that two key federations, 
the US and Australia, have not ratiﬁ  ed 
the treaty [20]. 
    The problems federations have 
with compliance with international 
treaties can occur at several levels. 
First, as already mentioned, the 
necessary powers to ensure compliance 
with a treaty may not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the federal level 
of government. While in many 
federations, the federal power to 
sign treaties may permit them to 
override the jurisdiction of regional 
governments, this is not necessarily 
always the case. And in scenarios in 
which the federal government does 
have the necessary constitutional 
authority, they may choose not to 
exercise it because of political concerns 
about creating conﬂ  ict with regional 
governments. Even in scenarios in 
which the federal government has 
the necessary legislative power and 
does choose to exercise it, regional 
governments may not be able to cope 
with the ﬁ  nancial and/or practical 
burdens of compliance [21]. This latter 
issue, of unfunded mandates, is not 
unique to federal states and constitutes 
a challenge that all WHO member 
nations will need to address when 
determining how to implement the 
surveillance requirements of the new 
IHR. 
  Guidance  to  Federations
    It is apparent that this “federalism 
dilemma” will need to be addressed, 
both by member nations and by 
the WHO, if the revised IHR are to 
be implemented successfully. It is 
primarily incumbent upon federations, 
as responsible members of the 
international community, to take every 
measure available to ensure that they 
can comply with the new IHR. These 
measures would include using what 
constitutional means may be available 
to centralize necessary public health 
powers concerning surveillance and 
outbreak response, making efforts 
to establish effective collaborative 
intergovernmental arrangements, 
and developing appropriate public 
health capacity at the local level. The 
intergovernmental acrimony to which 
federations are susceptible would 
clearly not be acceptable if, at a time 
of crisis, it produced a dysfunctional 
response that resulted in the 
international spread of disease. 
    The WHO, in turn, must make 
efforts to assist federations in this 
regard. These efforts could include 
the provision of guidelines on 
strategies federal governments can 
use to address some of the challenges 
we have described. For example, the 
constitutions of some federations may 
have unexploited powers that federal 
governments could utilize to gain the 
necessary authority. Constitutions 
are often interpreted in a ﬂ  exible 
manner by courts, in recognition of 
the realities of a changing world. The 
threat of pandemic infections could 
be taken strongly into consideration 
when courts are interpreting the 
use of federal powers. Of course, 
there are important limitations to 
this strategy, including the fact that 
any constitutional interpretation will 
need to strike a balance between new 
public health powers and respect 
for fundamental human rights and 
traditional allocations of government 
power, both of which may constrain 
the expansion of federal authority. 
Furthermore, heavy-handed, top-
down approaches to managing 
disease outbreaks are not ideal, 
given the critical importance of 
local and regional public health 
activities. Ideally, responses would be 
a collaborative venture between orders 
of government. 
    To facilitate such collaboration, 
federal governments could enter into 
agreements with regional governments 
to ensure cooperation on matters 
such as the timely and adequate 
transfer of data. The likelihood of 
adherence to such agreements would 
be greatly enhanced if conditional 
funding were provided by the federal 
government to assist in developing the 
necessary surveillance and response 
infrastructure at the local level. This 
option is particularly important to 
consider because adequate federal 
powers will have no effect in the 
absence of adequate surveillance 
infrastructure or public health capacity. 
Governance strategies must go hand in 
hand with effective surveillance and the 
development of necessary public health 
capacity [22].
  Conclusion
    Given the importance of the IHR 
revision process, every effort should 
be made to ensure that member 
nations can comply with the new 
requirements. The size and power 
of several federations in the World 
Health Organization require that the 
particular nuances of their governance 
structure be acknowledged and 
respected. Failure to do so could 
threaten the long-term support of the 
IHR by key federations, such as the 
United States, India, and Russia, which 
would undermine their fundamental 
objective of protecting the global 
community. Ultimately, however, it 
is the responsibility of federations to 
make the appropriate adjustments 
in their approach to public health 
governance so that they can effectively 
identify, respond to, and communicate 
information on disease outbreaks.   
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Heavyhanded, top-down 
approaches to managing 
disease outbreaks are 
not ideal.
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